Philosophy

Mackie’S Argument From Queerness

Mackie’s argument from queerness is one of the most influential critiques of moral realism in modern philosophy. This argument challenges the idea that there are objective moral values existing independently of human thought. Instead, it suggests that if such values did exist, they would be unlike anything else in the universe strange, mysterious, and metaphysically queer. Exploring this argument helps us understand debates in metaethics, particularly between moral realists and moral anti-realists, and raises important questions about whether morality is discovered or invented by human beings.

Understanding the Argument from Queerness

The argument from queerness is developed by J.L. Mackie in his work on ethics, particularly in his bookEthics Inventing Right and Wrong. Mackie was a moral skeptic who rejected the existence of objective moral values. The argument from queerness is designed to show why it is implausible to believe in moral facts as objective, mind-independent truths.

The Two Sides of Queerness

Mackie divides the argument from queerness into two main components the metaphysical and the epistemological. Together, these components create a powerful case for moral anti-realism.

  • Metaphysical QueernessMoral properties, if they existed, would be very strange entities. They would have to be intrinsically prescriptive, meaning they inherently tell us what we ought to do.
  • Epistemological QueernessEven if such properties existed, we would need a special faculty of moral perception or intuition to know them, which seems difficult to explain scientifically.

Metaphysical Queerness Explained

Mackie argues that moral properties would be unlike any natural property we observe in the world. For example, the property of goodness would not just describe something but would contain an intrinsic demand to pursue it. This makes moral properties unique, because no other property in nature contains built-in action-guiding force. For Mackie, this kind of property seems too metaphysically strange to exist.

The Problem of Intrinsic Prescriptivity

According to Mackie, if objective moral values existed, they would have to motivate action simply by being recognized. For instance, if we knew something was morally wrong, we would be compelled to avoid it, regardless of our desires. This connection between moral knowledge and motivation makes moral facts different from descriptive facts like the sky is blue. This difference is part of what Mackie calls their queerness.

Epistemological Queerness Explained

The second part of Mackie’s argument concerns how we could possibly know about objective moral values. If they are non-natural and prescriptive, then ordinary sense perception or scientific reasoning would not be enough to access them. Mackie argues that we would need a special moral sense or intuition, a kind of sixth sense, to detect them.

Skepticism About Moral Knowledge

Mackie is skeptical that we have such a faculty. He suggests that it is more reasonable to explain moral beliefs as human inventions products of evolution, culture, and psychology rather than as discoveries of objective truths. This view aligns with moral anti-realism, which holds that moral statements do not describe facts about the world but express human attitudes and preferences.

Relation to Moral Subjectivism

Mackie does not argue that morality is meaningless. Instead, he believes that moral rules are human constructions that serve practical purposes, such as coordinating behavior and promoting social cooperation. This view is sometimes called an error theory, because it claims that moral statements make false claims about objective reality but still play an important role in human life.

Practical Implications

If Mackie is correct, then moral debates are not about discovering objective truths but about negotiating shared values. This approach can lead to a more flexible and pragmatic view of ethics, where moral rules can be revised when circumstances change.

Criticisms of the Argument from Queerness

Despite its influence, the argument from queerness has been challenged by many philosophers. Moral realists argue that Mackie’s demand for metaphysical parsimony is too strict and that we should not reject moral facts just because they are unique. Some also argue that moral knowledge can be explained through reason and reflection, without appealing to mysterious intuition.

  • Some philosophers claim that moral properties can be natural properties, reducing the need for metaphysical queerness.
  • Others argue that moral motivation can be explained psychologically, without requiring moral facts to be intrinsically prescriptive.
  • Kantians and intuitionists suggest that moral reasoning is a rational faculty, not a mysterious sixth sense, and therefore is not epistemologically queer.

Importance in Metaethics

The argument from queerness remains a central point of discussion in metaethics. It challenges philosophers to clarify what kind of entities moral properties would have to be and how we could know about them. It also forces moral realists to defend the plausibility of objective values and to show why belief in them is justified.

Influence on Later Thinkers

Mackie’s ideas have inspired many later philosophers to explore error theory, expressivism, and constructivism as alternatives to moral realism. His skepticism has also encouraged researchers to investigate the psychological and evolutionary origins of moral belief, connecting philosophy to empirical science.

Mackie’s argument from queerness is a powerful and provocative critique of moral realism, pushing us to question whether morality is discovered or invented. By highlighting the metaphysical strangeness and epistemological challenges of objective moral values, Mackie invites us to consider morality as a human creation designed to solve practical problems. Whether one accepts or rejects his argument, it remains an essential part of the conversation about the nature of ethics, encouraging deeper reflection on how we justify moral claims and how we should live in a world where objective moral facts might not exist.